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The literature on the effects of environmental policy on intemational competitiveness consists
mainly of partial equilibrium models. From a methodological point of view a general
equilibrium approach is to be preferred. Only very few studies take a general equilibrium
point of view but they do not reach clear~ut conclusions and do not to perforrn sensitivity
analyses. ln the present paper we make a contribution to the general equilibrium approach
and provide some interesting numerical examples, showing that partial equilibrium results do
not generally hold in a general equilibrium setting. This has important implications for tax
policies in the presence of environmental externalities.
1. Introduction
Loosely speaking the expression "ecological dumping" is used to describe the phenomenon
that govemments, acting strategically, impose too lax environmental taxes in order to
enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms on the world market. Seminal work on the
theory of ecological dumping and strategic behaviour in the context of intemational trade has
bcen done by Rauscher (1994). His work is important in several respects. First, it provides a
clear definition of the phenomenon of ecological dumping. Second, it constructs a simple but
full-fledged general equilibrium model of intemational trade involving externalities. Third,
for several market structures it is shown that, contrary to populaz views, ecological dumping
might, in the absence of the possibility of reaching a first best optimum due to the
unavailability of the desired instruments, not be beneficial from a welfaze point of view.
The analysis makes clear that it is difficult to obtain general results and, indeed,
particular assumptions with respect to the functions involved have to be made. Sometimes
these assumptions do not refer to exogenous parameters but to the values of these functions,
or their derivatives, in the presupposed equilibrium or even to the value of determinants
composed in a complex way from equilibrium values. This makes it difficult to see from the
primitives of an economy (i.e. the parameter values of the model) which conclusions are
likely to hold.
In the present paper an attempt is undertaken to provide numerical examples that
will reveal the dependence of results on the basic parameters used. We first sketch the
approach taken by Rauscher and summarise his results. Subsequently specific functional
forms will be introduced to illustrate his findings. [n addition the present paper offers a
formal general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition and strategic environmental
policy, aftcr a discussion of a partial equilibrium approach along the lines set out by Barrett
l
(1994). The intemational trade Iiterature pays increasing attention to strategic behaviour,
which make it espccially interesting to study oligopolistic markets, where such behaviour is
pertinent.
2. The model
The models discussed throughout this paper have several chazacteristics in common that are
outhned m thc present section. The models are all inspired by the model used by Rauscher
(o.c.). A difference is that we shall work wnth emission taxes instead of standazds
throughout. In the casc of perfect competition taxes allow us to work with the concept of
factor price frontier which brings along some advantages.
There are three consumer commodities, there is capital and there is a raw material.
-The first consumer commodity is produced and consumed domestically only. Production
takes place according to a technology described by a production function (Fi ), with capital
( k~ ) and raw material (y~ ) as inputs. The first consumer commodity serves as the
numéraire. Consumption is denoted by ci.
-The second consumer commodity is produced domestically, according to a production
function (FZ ), having capital (kZ ) and raw material (y2 ) as arguments. Part of the output
is consumed domestically (cz ), part of it is exported (x) . Foreign demand depends on the
export price (p2 ). Hence x- x(p~ ). Introduction of a competing commodity will be
postponed until section 5, where oligopolistic world markets are introduced.
-The third consumer commodity can not be produced domestically. It is imported
Consumption is denoted by c, . Its world market price is p3 . Throughout the paper that
price is given to the economy.
-Capital is immobile intemationally but mobile between domestic sectors. Empirical as well
as theoretical support for the assumption of international immobility of capital can be found
in Gordon and Bovenberg (1996). The economy's endowment is given by k. The domestic
rate of return on capital is r.
-The raw material is in principle freely available in unlimited amounts. However, processing
of the raw material causes pollution, which is deemed damaging. For that reason the
government levies taxes r~ and rZ per unit of raw material used by the firms. These taxes
can bc differentiated betwcen sectors. The tax revenues are recycled to the consumers in a
lump sum fashion.
2
There is one representative consumer. His income consists of the value of the capital
endowment rk , the tax revenues r,y, t zZyz , and the profits of the firms, which amount to
T(k i, y, )- rk~- ri yi and pZ FZ ( kZ , y~ ) - rkZ - z2 y2 for the sheltered and the exposed
sector respectively, assuming for the moment that the domestic price of the second
commodity equals its world market price. Under the assumption of full employment of
capital ( in a situation where finns maximise profits) total income boils down to (in
shorthand) 1.~ t p2Fz. The consumer are maximizes utility, taking prices and income given.
Preferences of the consumer refer to two types of commodities. First, they depend on the
consumption of the consumer goods. This is represented by a utility function, denoted by
U(ci , c, , c3 ), which is assumed to have all the usually desired properties such as concavity,
differentiability and monotonicity. The use of the raw material brings along pollution (in a
proportional way). That is the primary reason for the taxation. This part of the preferences is
given by the (convex and increasing) damage function D(y, t y2 ).
An assumption made in the first sections of the paper is that in each sector of the
economy there are a large number of price-taking competing firms, identical per sector,
which are all profit maximising. Later on, we discuss monopoly and oligopolistic market
structures.
3. The first best optimum; full competition and monopoly
Several steps will be taken in the framework developed above. The first step is to calculate
the social optimum subject to equilibrium on the current account: p,c3 -pZx(pz).
Mathematically, the problem to be solved by the central planner is to find rates of
consumption, mputs in production and exports such that
U(c'~,cz~c3)-D(y~ f1'z)
is maximised, subject to
3
(3.1) ci - F~ (ki , y~ )
(3.2) cz-F2(k2.yz)-x(Pz)
(33) P3c3 - Pzx(Pz)
(34) k, tkz -k
The Lagrangian of the problem reads:
1--U(c~,cx,c3)-U(Y~ tyz)t~~IF(kuy~)-~~]t~.[Fz(k:,Yz)-x(Pz)-~x]
tW3~Pzx(Pz)-P3c3)tf~(k - k, -kz)
Assuming an interior solution and differentiability, in the equilibrium, of the functions
involved, we find as necessary conditions
U~, - ~D ~
U~, - Wz
tly -P3~3
~,f~k - li; Dy - N,F,y
~zFzk - Il; Dy - tPzFzy
-rPzxp trOs~xtPzxo)~ fl
where subscripts refer to (partial) derivatives. In the sequel stars will denote the solution of
this problem: (ci , cZ , c3 , pZ , k~ , kZ , y~ , yZ , x~). Also the corresponding multipliers are
denoted by stars.
The second step is to show that the first best optimum can be realised in a
decentralised setting. To that end emission taxes are set equal to the marginal damage of
emissions, domestic prices of the first two commodities should equal world market prices
and an import tariff on the third commodity should be imposed. It is assumed ttiat the
exporting industry consists of many price-taking firms, but that the economy as a whole can
influence prices on the world market.
4
Take
w ~ P~ Dy (y~ t y2 )
~.
P~ - 1, PZ - P~ - ~. ~ Pr - 1 ~ t - ~pi ~ r - ~~(lt .)
E
Here e~ is the price elasticity of world market demand for the second commodity whieh,
evaluated at the optimum should be smaller than minus unity. Due to the concavitylwnvexity
assumptions the necessary conditions corresponding with the first best social optimum are
also sufficient. Hence, the following holds.
-The pair ( k; , y; ) maximises the profits F(ki , y~ )- rk~ - ry~ of firm l. Tiils is the case
bccausc it maximiscs
w' o(y, -~ y~ )r(k~,y~)-w~ k' w~
-For the same reason (k2 , yz ) maximises the profits of firm 2, which takes the world
mazket price as given.
-The triple (c; ,cZ,c; ) maximises
U(c„cz,cj)
subject to
c~ t Pzcz t P,c, - F, f pzFz t T
where T denotes the recycled import tariff revenues T--p;c; I (1 t E~). The triple
satisfies the first-best necessary conditions for optimality; the latter are also sufficient in
view of the concavity of Ihe utility function. Furthermore, it is affordable because
equilibrium on the balance of payments implies that
c~ t Pzcz t P3 cs - F t Pz [Fz - x(P~ )J } P3 L p3 x(Pz ))
-FtpzFzfT
5
-Finally, all markets clear at the proposed prices.
This result about implementation is well-known from the general theory of international
trade. It implies that in the case of full competition on the world market for the exported
commodity (e --~), it is optimal not to impose an import tariff and to tax emissions
according to their marginal damage. Moreover, in the case of a monopoly the first-best
optimum can be mimicked in a decentralised economy by setting emissions taxes equal to
marginal damage, as in full competition, and by using a tariff on the imported commodity.
4. The second best policy in monopoly
This section assumes that, due to international regulations, it is not feasible to use tariffs as
an instrument. Then one has to look for a second-best solution. In the case of perfect
compctition tariffs are not needed to reach the first-best optimum. Therefore our attention
will be restricted to monopoly here.
The ques[ions addressed are whether it is optimal to differentiate between domestic
sectors with respect to the emission taxes and whether taxes aze below the marginal damage
or not. Rauscher identifies ecological dumping by taxing below marginal damage (or
emission standards corresponding to such taxes) or by the export sector paying a smaller
cmission fee (or having more lax standards) than the sheltered sector. In section 5 we add a
third altemative measure of ecological dumping, taking into account the average taxation in
case taxation is not uniform over sectors.
Several approaches can be taken to tackle the questions. Rauscher (o.c.) applies an
analytical approach, as was done above, looking at total utility, arising from the optimal
behaviour of consumers and producers, which all take mazket prices as given, and letting the
government subsequently calculate the optimal emission taxes (in Rauscher's case emission
standards), given that it is not feasible to impose an import tariff. Unfortunately, Rauscher
finally obtains a mathematical expression whose sign is difficult to determine on the basis of
Iheoretical reasoning (the assumption of strict concavitylconvexity of the functions involved
still leads to ambiguity). It is assumed that the cross-derivative of the production functions is
sufficiently large in equilibrium. Then it follows that ecological dumping not necessarily
occurs. However, this cross derivative is not a primitive parameter of the model: its value is
endogenous in a general equilibrium. In view of Rauscher's efforts it seems impossible to
reach analytical results without further specifying the functions involved. We advocate an
G
approach whcre specific functional forms are chosen, such that numerical exercises can be
conductcd. Beforc doing so we reproduce Rauscher's argument for the model at hand.
Suppose the government has set optimal cmission taxes, subject to the constraints
that the tax ratcs do not differ between sectors and such that they equal marginal damage. In
a competitive economy the representative consumer maximises utility subject to the budget
constraint. This yields
U~, - U~, ~ Pz - U~, ~ P3.
It follows from profit maximisation that
F~k - PzFzk - r, Fy - ii - P:Fzy - tz - DYU~ .
Moreover,
~i-F. ~'z-Fz-X(Pz), ~s-PzX(Pz)~P3.
Hence the change in welfare (dW) following a change in the tax rate for sector 1 is:
dY dY dP
cdf-[W - U` [Fk dii t F,Y ~i ~ f pz' [PzFzt ~z t P:Fzy ~z - Pzxp ~I ~
t p~' [x ~' t pzxy ~i ]- D'[~~ tdz]
Using the properties of the general competitive equilibrium we find:
~ dPz
dr~ -U`'Xdr~




Hence the welfare effect of a deviation from equal emission taxes depends only on the impact
on the terms of trade (i.e., thc price of the exported commodity). So, if a decrease of the
emission tax imposed on the sheltered non-exporting sector has a less negative effect on Ihe
terms of tradc than an equivalent decrcase for the exporting sector, then it is beneficial to tax
the exporting sector less than the sheltered sector. This is of course in accordance with the
findings of Rauscher for the case of emission standards.
Rauscher's subsequent argument, for the case of emission standards, can now be
sketchcd as follows, Suppose the govemment considers imposing a more lax emission
standard on the exporting sector than the one corresponding with marginal damage. The
cheaper availability of the raw material for the export sector increases production in that
sector and decreases the world market price. Suppose the standard for the sheltered sector is
relaxed. Taking prices fixed, the marginal productivity of capital in that sector increases,
which in the case of no underemployment causes a flow of capital out of the exporting sector
into the sheltered sector,thereby reducing exports of [he exporting sector and increasing the
export price. Since production in the sheltered sector is enhanceá, its price relative to the
pricc of the other produced commodity decreases, and therefore the relative world market
price of the exported commodity increases. Hence, relaxing the emission standard in the
sheltered sector has two opposing effects on the terms of trade and the aggregate effect is not
clear beforehand. We cannot perform a similar analysis with emission taxes because in
equilibrium the rate of return on capital and the emission tau should always lie on the factor
pricc frontier of the respective sectors.
We turn to some numerical exercises, which allow us not only to determine in which
direction a deviation from a uniform tax rate is optimal but also to calculate the full
optimum. We propose the following specifications.
(4.1)U(c„cz,c~ ) - In c, t ln cz f In c3
(4.2) Fi (ki ,Yi ) - kiQ Yi-e
(4.3)Fz(kz,yz) - ki yz ~
(4.4)D(1'~ tYz)-r(Y~ }Yz)z
(4.5) x(pz )- pi , e c 0
8
Its simplicity and thc fact that these specifications are widely used can defend this choice, at
least modestly.
it follows from utility maximisation subject to the budget constraint that
ci - Pzcz - P~c3 -'3IFi f PzFz~
Together with the conditions for market equilibrium ((F - c~ , Fz - cz t x( pz )) this
yields:
ci - Pz~Pz ), cz -x(Pz ), c3 - Pz~Pz )~ Pi
It follows from profit maximisation that equilibrium prices are on the factor price frontiers,
corresponding with zero profits, defined by:
(4.6) 1-r~lar
r, l ~ a
-8~(r,zi)lal ll-aJ
Pz -(,QJ el 1 TzQ)
~-e -







(4.11) Yz(r,t:,F:)-(r)e( S?) BFz(i 1- (i
y
Welfare optimisation on the part of the government should take the constraints
outlined above into account After some straigh[forward substitutions the Lagrangian can be
written as
I n pzx(Pz ) t In x(Pz ) t In P: X(P: ) ~ P3 - r I1'~ (r, t, , Pz x(Pz )) tYz (r,t z~ X(Pz ))~z
t~.Lk~ (r,t„Pzx(Pz )) t kz(r, tz, X(Pz )) - k l } wil1- Si (r,i~ )] t wz IPz - Sz (r, tz)l
This poses a well-defined mathematical programming problem that can in principle be
solved. However, even the simple functional forms we selected do not allow for much
analytical work. Something can be said though. Denoting a percentage change of a variable
z by y, we find that Y ~-(1 t e~, Y~- eril, y~~ -(1 t e)u~, where w is defined by
1-a 1-a
cu I(i --áY ~, }RY., .
Therefore, if the price elasticity of world demand is not too negative and the emission tax on
the exported commodity is increased, whereas the emission tax on the sheltered sector is
decreased, utility from consumption will increase, If, moreover, the weight attached to
pollution is small, such a policy will have a positive total welfare effect.
We perform several numerical experiments. All the calculations were done in
Mathematica (see Wolfram (1996) and CulioG (1996)). We use the following parameter
values: oe - R, k- 10, p3 - 1. This presents a case where the exertion of monopoly power
in international trade dces not necessarily imply "ecological dumping", i.e., lower emission
taxes in the exporting sector than in the sheltered sector.
We solve the model numerically as follows. Fix 2~ . Then r is determined by
equation (4.6). If, in addition, tz is óxed, equation (4.7) determines pz. From this we can
derive foreign demand and subsequently the rates of consumption. Hence also production is
determined and therefore the capital and raw materials inputs. However, we loose one degree
of freedom because of the clearing of the capital market: k, t kz - 10. This enables us to
determine tz. We conclude that equilibrium in the product and capital markets leaves the
government with one degree of freedom ( t~) to maximise the social welfare function.
IO
Figure 4.1 depicts the results for [he case where the príce elasticity of world demand
(e) equals -1~2'. The optimal tax ratc ratio tz I ti is drawn as a function ofthe production
elasticity of capital, which is assumed equal in both production sectors (a -~. These
elasticities range from 0. I to 0.8.
Insert figure 4. I about here
It is seen that in this case the exporting sector should be taxed hígher than the
sheltered sector to maximise (second best) social welfare. The more so when the production
elasticity gets larger and the production elasticity of the raw matenal (pollution) gets smaller.
The intuition is that with inelastic world demand the temu of trade can be improved
considerably by taxing the exporting sector, especially when the production elasticity of
pollution as input is relatively small.
This intuition is to some extent confirmed in figure 4.2 where the same exercise is
performed for a price elasticity of world demand equal to -0.95.
[nsert figure 4.2 about here
Here wc see that the exporting sector should be taxed more heavily for small values of the
production elasGCity of capital, and less severely when the production elasticity of capital
becomes higher. The tax rates in this case are equal when the production elasticity of capital
is about 0.52. Notice however that the optimal domestic ratio is decreasing now instead of
increasing as in the previous case. This is due to the high price elasticity of world demand.
The phenomenon described here is even more pronounced in figure 4.3, where we
have used a highly elastic world demand (e --2).
Insert figure 4.3 about here.
As a third approach to investigating the occurrence of ecological dumping one could
compare the marginal damage of emissions to social welfare with the sectors' emissions tax
rates as well as the average emission rate (z). The marginal damage of emissions is
D' (y, } yZ ) in terms of social welfare. The monetary equivalent is found by dividing
' Note that demand is assumed inelastic here. In the presence of our particular monopolistic
structure this poses no problem, because the government creates a monopolistic price for price-
taking firms.
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D' (y) by the marginal welfare of income, U~ . The following table shows the various rates
for selected values of a when e--2.
a T~ T~ z D~
0.4 1.3 7457 l 46807 1.43552 1.15869
0.45 1.46327 l.44211 I.4491 1. l 5703
0.5 I.57536 1.40747 1.4593 l 1.1505
0.55 I.72303 I. 36297 1.46502 1.13793
0.6 1.92818 I.30747 1.46464 1. l 1796
0.65 2.23357 1.23999 1.45587 1.08887
0.7 2.73293 1.15991 L43528 L04864
As one can see the tax rates are much higher than marginal social damage would indicate.
Foreign consumers can be effectively taxed to finance a domestic policy of `anti-pollution'.
As a conclusion from these exercises we can state that there are indeed examples
where it pays to tax the exporting sector more heavily than the sheltered sector. Also, there is
a strong sensitivity of this result with respect to the production elasticities and the price
elasticity of world demand, which would be worthwhile to sNdy in more detail. However this
was not the intention of the present section.
5. Oligopoly; partial equilibrium
In this section we consider the case where the country under investigation is an oligopolist on
the world market. It is common in the literature to study the oligopoly case in a partial
equilibrium framework. Rauscher is an exception, but he dces not provide a formal analysis.
In the next section we shall work within the general equilibrium framework, developed
above. But first we summarise the work by Barrett (1994).
We cast Barrett's basic model in the format used above. It is quite common in the
literature to restrict attention to the case where the exported commodity is not consumed
domestically. We adhere to that assumption. In Barrett's model domestic and foreign fim~s
compete on the world market. The symbol xjdenotes the total supply by the foreign firrns.
Let there be n(? 1) domestíc producers, indexed by i, of the exported commodity. Note that
this index dces not indicate the sector, as in the prevíous sections, but ftrtns within the
exporting sector. For simplicity it is assumed that the unit cost functions of all firms are
identical: c; (r, t) - c(r, t). Total domestic production is x-~ x~ . In the Bazrett model
12
the firm's costs consist of production costs, depending only on production, and abatement
costs, depending on production as well as on the emission standard set by the govemment.
Since we want to stay as close as possible to the general equilibrium model set out above,
and since this still scrvcs to illustrate the main idea behind Barrett's work, our model dces
not incorporate abatemcnt nor emission standards. Instead we use emission taxes.
In the partial equilibrium approach the government takes as given all that occurs in
the domestic sheltercá sector. Neither is the government is interested in total social welfare
per se: pollution by the aggregate domestic sectors is not taken into account. Hence the
government seeks to maximise export revenues minus social costs, the latter consisting of
capital costs and the extemal damage costs caused by emissions of the exporting sector. In
the sequel a distinetion is made between Coumot and Bertrand competition.
a. Cournot competition
In Barrett's benchmark scenario the government takes output of domestic and foreign firms
as given. In such circumstances, given the output of the domestic firms, the optimal standard
arises from the equality of marginal abatement costs and marginal damage. Implementation
of this rule requires information about the abatement cost function. In our model an
analogous approach would be to assume that the govemment knows the production function,
from which demand for the raw material (and hence emissions) can be derived. Taking
íic
Shephard's lemma and constant retums to scale into account, this implies y; -~ x, .
Subsequently the government sets the uniform tax rate equal to marginal damage. Hence,
t- D'(~ ~x; )- D'(~ x), from which r can be solved as a function of the outputs.
This is an increasing function because of the concavity of the unit cost function and the
convexity of the damage function.
Each firm maximises its profits taking other firms' supply and input prices as given.
It follows that
p'(x txl)x, tp(xtxf)- c(r,r)
where p denotes Ihe inverse world demand function. So supply by domestic fimis is
downward sloping as a function of the emission fee. Together with the tax rate schedule
derived above this establishes the firm's reaction function. It is assumed to be downward
sloping, as is the case if the demand function is linear.
13
Social welfare is given by
W- p(xfxf)x-r~k; -D(~y,)
where it is to bc undcrstood that damage is expresscd in monetary values. The effect of a
change in thc emission tax rate, evaluated at the marginal damage, is given by:
dW cix ár~ dY dk,
~ - p'(xtx~)x~~ t~)tP(xfx~)~ -r~~ -D'(~y~)~ ~
Taking into account that k, - ~ x; , y; - ~ x; , z- D', we find (in shorthand
notation):
dW rir dx drf
~- IP' x f p] dt ~(r' i) dt } P x ctc
n- 1 dr dx ~ dx
- P~x n dt }P x dx dt
Clearly the sign of the effect of lowering the emission tax rate is not unambiguous in general.
However, if there is one domestic producer the first term on the right hand side vanishes. The
dzf dx
second term on the right hand side is negative, because p'~ 0,~ ~ 0, ~ ~ 0. Hence, if
there is one domestic producer, it is optimal to set emission taxes lower than marginal
damage. If there are multiple domestic producers it might be optimal to have higher emission
taxes. Two types of impacts can be distinguished due to a decrease in the emission tax rate.
On the one hand, the government has an incentive to relax the tax rate below marginal
damage because in doing so production will be increased, thereby enhancing profits from
exports on the world market, at least as long as the reaction curves are downward sloping.
On the other hand, the domestic firms are also competing amongst each other and
consequently producing more than in the case of a domestic monopoly. The total effect is
therefore not unambiguous. This is also found by Barrett (o.c.) and by Ulph (1997), who
employ a somewhat different model, but to which the same type of argument applies.
c~(r, r) c~(r, z)
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To illustrate the results obtained for the general case we return to the example of a
Cobb-Douglas technology, a quadratic damage function of section 4, with a single domestic
producer. For computational simplicity we employ a linear world demand function:
p(x t x~ )- 1-a[x t x r]. Demand for the raw material is
y -CRJpCIj p) px
Without strategic behaviour on the part of the government the emission tax rate equals
marginal damage: 2- D'(y) - y. Combining the two equations we get a relationship
betwecn the emission tax and output.
9 B
(s.l)
i-~p~ 1~B ~ t
1 RJ
i.~ x i'p
Paraphrasing Barrett this schedule can be called the environmentally optima! emission rax.
Next we consider the possibility of strategic behaviour on the part of the govemment. Given
the tax rate the exporting firm maximises its profits
[1- a[x t xj ]]x -c(r, r)x
After some straightforward manipulations this yields:
(5.2) 1-2ax-axI -~l
T~1~-a~~`e
Note that the reaction curve is indeed downward sloping for all tax rates. The next question
is what happens when the emission tax is lowered, below the "environmentally optimal" one.
Clearly, given the foreign country's output, the domestic firm's reaction curve shifts outward
and the new equilibrium has higher domestic production and less foreign production. What is




dW ctx drf dr dk dy dx
di -[1-2ax-ax~]dt
~ cix ch-~rdr}ydr]át
This expression has to be evaluated at the environmentally optimal emission fee. Hence
t- y. In an optimum for the firm we have 1- 2ctt - axf - c(r, t) . Hence
dW dxl dr
dr- ~dx dz
Taking into account that
dx dx~
~~Oand ~~0,
we can conclude that it is indeed optimal for the government to set an emission tax lower
than the environmentally op[imal one. This is not only true under the assumption that the
foreign government dces not react strategically, but the conclusion holds as well if the
foreign govemment does react strategically.
b. Bertrand competition
Here the case of competition by means of prices is considered. Banett's results are reversed
now: the countries impose more stringent standards than the "environmentally op[imal" ones.
We go into the partial equilibrium analysis for our particular model below. We employ a
linear demand curve again:
x- I-ap2 thpr
where a and 6 are positive constants and pf denotes the price set by the foreign country.
Again the govemment takes in first instance the prices (and therefore output) as given. This
yields the environmcntally optimal emission tax, which is equal to the one derived above,
with production replaced by the demand funetion.
16




Social welfare equals revenues minus capital costs minus environmental damage. In
the casc at hand the reaction curve is increasing and the sign of the change in welfare due to
a change in the taY rate equals:
JdSign bp2 ~-p~
dr
which is clearly positive, since an increase in the tax rate shifts the reaction curve upward,
causing the foreign price to increase. This holds in the absence of govemmental policy by the
foreign country. But, clearly, in a Nash equilibrium both govemments will set their taxes
higher than environmentally optimal.
c. Domestic consumption
A more realistic case is one where domesUc consumption of the exported commodity is
allowed for. It received only minor attention in the literature. According to Ulph (1997), if
there is domestic consumption and the domestic market is oligopolistic, there is an incentive
for the government to impose less stringent taxation in the case of Coumot competition
because imperfect competition will in general lead to too low output levels from the point of
view of social welfare. Hence production for the domestic market should be stimulated.
6. Oligopoly; general equilibrium
In this section a gencral equilibrium model is constructed with one domestic producer who is
an oligopolist on the world market. For the time being we abstract from domestic
consumption of the commodity, as in the previous section.
The motivation for analysing oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting was
originally given by Rauschcr, who argues thatthe strategy of increasing domestic production
(in his case by relaxing the standards) has an effect also on the allocation of capital in the
economy through the rate of return. This effect is neglected in a partial equilibrium setting,
but still it might be important.
17
We employ a slightly modified version of the model of section 4. Attention will be
restncted to Cournor competition with one domestic producer. National income equals
!i t pzl-2 . In view of the utility functions and in the absence of domestic consumption of
the exported commodity, it follows from utility maximisation on the part of the consumers
that:
c,-rlFi}Pz~':~, c,-r[F,}pzFz]~Pr
Equilibrium on the current account implies that p3c, - p2 Fz - pz x. Hence
c~ - pzFz - pzx. Profit maximisation in the sheltered sector requires that the cquilibrium
prices lic on the factor price fronticr given by: 1- g~ (r, t~ ). See equation (4.6). When the
linear world demand function of the previous section is maintained, profit maximisation on
the part of the exporting sector implies




Sce equation (4.7). The capital and raw material inputs are given by ( 4.8)-(4.1 I).
The mathematical problem faced by the government can now be stated as:





(6.4) Yz - Yz(r~tz~x)
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(6.5) gi (r, r~ ) - 1
(6.6) p',(xtxl)xfpZ(xtxf)-g,(r,r,)
(6.7) k~ f k~ - k
This problem can not be solved in such a way that the sensitivity with respect to the
parameters can be detennined analytically, as one would wish to do in order to find out how
to set optimal taxes in different circumstances. Therefore a number of numerical
optimisations will be executed. In these exercises the following parameter values are used
throughout: k- 10, p3 - 1. The results are summarised in the figures displayed below.
In figure 6.1 we assume that the home country takes supply by the foreign country
as given. In particular xj - l. It is also assumed that world demand is linear with
a- 0 05, b- 1 and that (3 - 1- a. Depicted is 22 ~ t~ as a function of a.
[nsert figure 6. I about here
[t follows that, depending on the production elasticity of capital, there are again several
qualitatively different tax constellations in equilibrium. It might indeed be optimal to tax the
exporting sector more heavily, but the other way around is a possibility as well.
In the next figure we derive the overall equilibrium, where it is assumed that there is
perfect symmetry between the countries. So we now have a general equilibrium in both
countries as well as between them. In this run it is assumed that a- a as in the monopoly
model.
Insert figure 6.2 about here.
In figure 6.2 we display the reaction curves of both countries, which aze increasing, after
eliminating the Nash-equiibrium tax rates. If the production elasticities equal 0.5 the
equilibrium is found at x- xf - 1.6759... The equilibrium tax rates are
t~ - 1.887, tZ - 1.058. The table below compazes the emission tax rates to marginal
social damage. Clearly for this particulaz model the emission tax rates are often below
marginal damage. It is not true, however, that taxes tZ in the export sector are always below
the socially optimal rate. Note that in the neighbourhood of a- 1 ~ 2 the average rate is
19
higher than the socially optimal rate, although taxes in the export sector are below this value.
a z, zi i D'
0.2 0.889927 85.2619 1.08903 1.79578
0.3 0.974876 5.68604 1.26717 1.69743
0.4 1.21272 1 91 S88 l A0642 1.49S6S
O.S 1.8311 1.12756 1.41248 1.3857
0.6 3.89418 0.856093 1.27744 137999
0.7 17.0492 0 750334 1.07864 L4I03S
7. Conclusion
The present paper has addressed the issue of ecological dumping. We have developed a
model in the spirit of Rauscher, with emission taxes, that could be used to analyse several
market structures: full competition, monopoly and oligopoly. We were able to ascertain some
conjectures raised by Rauscher. It is indeed possible that in a second-best world where
import tariffs are not allowed, it is optimal in a situation of monopoly on the world market to
tax the exposed export sector more heavily than the sheltered sector. This conclusion holds
also in the case of an oligopoly on a third market. Hence the result obtained by Barrett, that
emission fees on the exporting sector are too low in the case of oligopoly does not hold true
anymore in a general equilibrium setting. We have also discussed an altemative measure of
ecological dumping where the average actual emission fees are compared with the socially
optimal emission tax. For further study we recommend more numerical exercises in order to
perform a sensitivity analysis to find out where switch points from one regime to another can
be found. This can be helpful in designing economic and environmental policy in practice.
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